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INTRODUCrION
Citizen suits under the Clean Water Act' are more prevalent than those filed
under any other federal environmental law that authorizes citizen suits.2 Not
surprisingly, one of the most important cases in environmental citizen suit ju-
risprudence, Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc.,3
arose in a Clean Water Act citizen suit. The Supreme Court's decision in
Gwaltney is perhaps the most extensively analyzed yet most frequently misun-
derstood standard in citizen suit jurisprudence under federal environmental
laws. Ten years after the Supreme Court issued its decision in Gwaltney, fed-
eral courts continue to struggle to ascertain the scope and applicability of the
Gwaltney standard.
In Gwaltney, the Supreme Court held that subject matter jurisdiction does
not attach for wholly past violations of National Pollutant Discharge Elimina-
tAdjunct Professor of Law, Vermont Law School. B.A., cum laude, University of Rochester,
1986; J.D., M.S.L., Vermont Law School, 1989. Previously, Mr. Abate was an environmental law
specialist with Arnold & Porter, New York, N.Y.
133 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
2There are two important reasons for the popularity of Clean Water Act citizen suits. First,
allegations in these actions are easier to prove because of the availability of evidence contained in
discharge monitoring reports (DMRs) that dischargers are required to file under the Act. Sec-
ond, civil penalties of up to $25,000 per violation, per day are available. 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (d)
(1994).
3484 U.S. 49 (1987).
tion System (NPDES) 4 permits alleged in citizen suits under the Clean Water
Act. 5 The Court concluded that subject matter jurisdiction attaches only when
a citizen suit plaintiff makes a good faith allegation of an ongoing violation. 6
Although the Gwaltney standard was developed in the context of the Clean
Water Act with its concomitant grounding in compliance records contained in
discharge monitoring reports, courts have liberally construed the standard to
govern past violations in citizen suits under other major federal environmental
statutes with different monitoring and enforcement schemes, such as the Clean
Air Act (CAA),7 the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),8 the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA),9 and the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know
Act (EPCRA).1° Courts have struggled to ascertain the scope and applicabil-
ity of the Gwaltney standard to citizen suits under these statutes.
The Gwaltney standard has been expanded, contracted, and distorted by
courts attempting to understand it, both within and outside the Clean Water
Act context. An important factor contributing to this confusion has been the
courts' inability to reach a consistent terminological understanding of "past
violations." Courts attempting to apply the Gwaltney standard have reviewed
two types of past violations in citizen suits under federal environmental laws:
1) "wholly past" violations that occurred and ceased prior to a citizen suit; and
2) "ongoing" violations that occurred prior to the filing of a citizen suit and
either continued in some form after the suit was filed, or where the citizen-
plaintiffs alleged in good faith that there was a reasonable likelihood that such
violations would continue. Courts have experienced confusion in discerning
whether wholly past or ongoing violations are at issue in a given case and in
determining whether citizen suit provisions other than those of the Clean
Water Act should be governed by the Gwaltney standard.
Part I of this article examines the structure and underlying policies of the
citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act. Part II reviews the history and
ultimate resolution of the Gwaltney case. Part III discusses the various ap-
proaches that courts have adopted in Clean Water Act cases to understand and
apply the Gwaltney "good faith allegation of an ongoing violation" standard.
Part IV addresses the application of the Gwaltney standard to citizen suits
under RCRA, CERCLA, and the Clean Air Act. Part V analyzes the judicial
misapplication of the Gwaltney standard to EPCRA citizen suits for past
violations.
The article concludes that the Gwaltney standard should be legislatively re-
vised to incorporate the "modified by parameter" approach11 to evaluating cit-
izen suits for past violations under the Clean Water Act. Moreover, the article
4Section 402 of the Clean Water Act allows the Adminstrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency to issue permits authorizing the discharge of pollutants in accordance with specified con-
ditions. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1994).
5 Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 64.
6Id. at 67.
742 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994).
81d. §§ 6901-6992k (1994).
9Id. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
Old. §§ 11001-11050 (1994).
1 See Part III. C., infra.
recommends that whatever form the Gwaltney standard takes in Clean Water
Act citizen suit jurisprudence, it should not be applied to govern citizen suits
for past violations under the Clean Air Act, RCRA, CERCLA, or EPCRA.
I. THE SOURCE OF THE CONTROVERSY: THE CITIZEN SUIT PROVISION OF
THE CLEAN WATER ACT
In 1972, Congress enacted the Clean Water Act to address the rising concern
over water quality in the nation. Congress declared as a national goal and
policy the restoration and maintenance of the "chemical, physical and biologi-
cal integrity of the Nation's waters.' 2 One mechanism that Congress devel-
oped to achieve this goal was the NPDES permit. 13 The Clean Water Act
prohibits the discharge of any pollutant without an NPDES permit, 14 and au-
thorizes the EPA Administrator or an appropriate state official to issue such
permits.
To ensure compliance with NPDES permits, Congress granted the EPA Ad-
ministrator authority to enforce any permit condition or limitation against any
person in violation of a permit, by issuing an administrative compliance order
or by initiating a civil action.' 5 Any person who violates an NPDES permit is
subject to civil penalties of up to $25,000 per violation, per day. 16
In less expansive terms, Congress also granted citizens authority to enforce
the permit provisions of the Clean Water Act. A citizen may commence a civil
action against any person who is "alleged to be in violation of ... an effluent
standard or limitation."'1 7 District courts have jurisdiction to enforce effluent
standards or limitations and may award civil penalties in Clean Water Act citi-
zen suits in accordance with section 309(d),18 the same section of the Clean
Water Act that authorizes the EPA Administrator to seek civil penalties.
1233 U.S.C. § 1251 (a).
1333 U.S.C. § 1342.
1433 U.S.C. § 1311.
1533 U.S.C. §§ 1319 (a)(2)(A), (B).
1633 U.S.C. § 1319 (d).
17Section 505 of the Clean Water Act provides in pertinent part:
(a) Authorization; jurisdiction
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section ... any citizen may commence a civil action on his
own behalf -
(1) against any person... who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation
under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a
standard or limitation....
(b) Notice
No action may be commenced -
(1) under subsection (a)(1) of this section -
(A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of the alleged violation (i) to the
Administrator, (ii) to the State in which the alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged
violator of the standard, limitation, or order, or
(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal
action in a court of the United States, or a State to require compliance with the standard, limita-
tion, or order, but in any such action in a court of the United States any citizen may intervene as
of right.
33 U.S.C. § 1365 (a), (b).
1833 U.S.C. § 1319 (d).
Unlike suits brought by the EPA Administrator, Clean Water Act citizen
suits are subject to additional procedural requirements. Citizens are precluded
from bringing a suit to enforce NPDES requirements unless they provide 60-
days notice of the impending action to the EPA Administrator, the state in
which the alleged violation occurs, and the alleged violator. 19 A citizen is also
precluded from bringing a suit if the EPA Administrator or the state has "com-
menced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action. '20 Although
worded slightly differently, the same preclusion of citizen suits appears again in
the EPA Administrator's enforcement section of the Clean Water Act.21 De-
spite these instances of preclusion, a citizen may intervene as of right in suits
brought by the EPA Administrator.22
The language of the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act is re-
peated, at least in part, in several other federal environmental statutes. For
example, the citizen suit provisions of RCRA and CERCLA essentially paral-
lel the structure and language of the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision
and its "alleged to be in violation" language. 23 The Clean Air Act's citizen suit
provision, after which its Clean Water Act counterpart was patterned, was re-
vised as part of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments to change its original
"alleged to be in violation" language to authorize recovery for past violations
where there is evidence that a violation has been repeated. 24 Conversely, EP-
CRA does not contain the "alleged to be in violation" language and lacks the
present tense structure of the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision. As Part
II of this article illustrates, the Gwaltney case addressed the unresolved contro-
versy concerning the nature and scope of enforcement authority under the citi-
zen suit provision of the Clean Water Act and, arguably, the similarly worded
citizen suit provisions of other federal environmental statutes. 25
191d. § 1365 (b)(1)(A).
201d. § 1365 (b)(1)(B).
21 Section 309 (g)(6)(A) provides in pertinent part:
(6) Effect of Order
(A) Limitation on actions under other sections
Action taken by the Administrator or the Secretary, as the case may be, under this subsection shall not
affect or limit the Administrator's or Secretary's authority to enforce any provision of this chapter;
except that any violation -
(i) with respect to which the Administrator or the Secretary has commenced and is diligently prose-
cuting an action under this subsection,...
shall not be the subject of a civil penalty action under subsection (d) of this section or section
1321(b) of this title or section 1365 of this title.
Id. § 1319 (g)(6)(A).
221d. § 1365 (b)(1)(B).
23 See Part IV. A., infra, for a discussion of the applicability of the Gwaltney standard to the
citizen suit provisions of RCRA and CERCLA.
24See Part IV. B., infra, for a discussion of the applicability of the Gwaltney standard to the
citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act.
25 See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (a)(1)(a) (1994); Toxic
Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (a)(1) (1994); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 300j-8 (a)(1) (1994); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (a)(1) (1994); Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42
U.S.C. § 11046 (a)(1) (1994).
II. HISTORY AND ULTIMATE RESOLUTION OF THE GWALTNEY CASE
A. The Split in the Circuits
The Supreme Court in Gwaltney granted certiorari to resolve a three-way
split among the First, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits concerning subject matter ju-
risdiction for citizen suits under the Clean Water Act alleging wholly past vio-
lations. The Fifth Circuit was the first among these circuits to address the
issue. In Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co.,26 the plaintiffs filed a
Clean Water Act citizen suit 11 months after an oil leak had contaminated a
creek on the plaintiffs' property. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' case for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit held that the language "alleged
to be in violation" in the Clean Water Act citizen suit provision confers juris-
diction only when the plaintiff alleges an ongoing violation. The court defined
"ongoing violation" to mean a violation occurring at the time the complaint
was filed.
The Fourth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Chesapeake Bay
Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd.27 Chesapeake Bay Foundation
(CBF) filed a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act against Gwaltney of
Smithfield alleging repeated violations of the fecal coliform, chlorine, and total
kjeldahl nitrogen (TKN) parameters of Gwaltney's NPDES permit. Relying
on Hamker, Gwaltney contended that because it had not violated its permit
since two weeks prior to the date that CBF filed suit, the complaint was based
on wholly past violations and should therefore be dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
The Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's conclusion that section 505(a)
of the Clean Water Act authorized citizen suits for wholly past violations of the
Act.28 It based its decision on a comparison between section 505 and section
309, which authorizes EPA civil actions. The court reasoned that because the
EPA is authorized to seek civil penalties under section 309 for wholly past
violations, and because section 505 directs civil penalties in accordance with
section 309(d), the Clean Water Act authorizes civil penalties for wholly past
violations alleged under section 505.29 The court distinguished Hamker from
the facts in Gwaltney on the ground that Hamker involved a single incident
that occurred almost one year prior to the time suit was filed which was un-
likely to recur.30
The First Circuit in Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.31
reached a conclusion that adopted a form of compromise between the holdings
in Hamker and Gwaltney concerning whether plaintiffs may recover civil pen-
alties for wholly past violations of the Clean Water Act. In Pawtuxet Cove, the
appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the Clean Water Act citizen suit, hold-
ing that the action lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court interpreted the
26756 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1985).
27791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986).28 1d. at 309.
29 1d. at 310.
30 d. at 312.
31807 F.2d 1089 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 975 (1987).
"alleged to be in violation" language of the citizen suit provision to require a
good faith allegation of a "continuing likelihood that the defendant, if not en-
joined, will again proceed to violate the Act."32
The First Circuit concluded that once such good faith allegations are shown,
civil penalties may be assessed for past violations. Thus, like the Fifth Circuit
in Hamker, the court stated that it would not confer subject matter jurisdiction
to a citizen suit premised solely on wholly past violations of the Clean Water
Act. The court, however, criticized the Hamker decision on the ground that
serious violations may be short in duration; in other words, proving that viola-
tions were occurring at the time of suit may be virtually impossible.
33
B. The Supreme Court's Decision in Gwaltney
In 1987, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Gwaltney case to re-
solve whether the "alleged to be in violation" language of section 505 of the
Clean Water Act confers subject matter jurisdiction for citizen suits seeking
recovery for wholly past violations of the Act. The Court held that the lan-
guage and legislative history of the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water
Act barred suits for wholly past violations.34 Adopting the holding in Pawtuxet
Cove, the Court imposed a requirement that a plaintiff must make a good faith
allegation of an ongoing violation to maintain such an action.35 While ac-
knowledging the vital function that citizen suits play in the overall enforcement
scheme of the Act, the Supreme Court in Gwaltney determined that Congress
intended citizen suits to have a prospective focus and play a supplementary
role in relation to government enforcement efforts.
36
The facts of the case are as follows. Gwaltney held an NPDES permit au-
thorizing the discharge of seven pollutants. Violations of five of these parame-
ters occurred repeatedly between 1981 and 1984; however, the violations of
only three of these limits was at issue in the case: chlorine, fecal coliform, and
total Kjeldahl nitrogen (TKN). Due to the installation of new pollution con-
trol equipment in March 1982, Gwaltney's chlorine violations ceased in Octo-
ber 1982.37 Gwaltney's last fecal coliform violation occurred on May 15, 1984,
just before the plaintiffs filed their complaint in June 1984. 38
The majority opinion in Gwaltney concluded that section 505(a) is ambigu-
ous.3 9 The Court noted that if Congress intended section 505(a) to authorize
citizen suits for wholly past violations, it could have done so in more explicit
statutory language. It further stated that the most natural reading of the "al-
leged to be in violation" language is a requirement that plaintiffs allege a state
of either "continuous" or "intermittent" violation.40 The Court held that citi-
zen suit plaintiffs must allege a reasonable likelihood that a past polluter will
32I1 at 1094.
33Id. at 1093.
34Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 56-67.
35 d. at 64.
361d. at 60-61.
37Id. at 53-54.
38Id. at 54.
39 d. at 57.
40 d.
continue to pollute in the future. The Court stated that the pervasive use of
the present tense in the language of the citizen suit provision indicates that
"the harm sought to be redressed by the citizen suit lies in the present or the
future, not in the past.
41
The Court also relied on the wording and underlying purpose of the 60-day
notice provision to support its conclusion. The Court stated that the notice
provision was designed to give an alleged violator an opportunity to come into
compliance with the Act. The Court reasoned that a citizen suit based on
wholly past violations in which the violator is currently in compliance would
render the notice to the violator "gratuitous." 42
The Court then turned to an analysis of the applicable legislative history.
The Court cited several passages of legislative history that indicate that the
citizen suit provisions of the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act (after
which the Clean Water Act provision was patterned) 43 were enacted to author-
ize citizens to abate pollution when the government cannot or will not com-
mand compliance." Thus, the Court stated that Congress intended the citizen
suit provision to be available only for prospective relief.
The Court's opinion concluded with a discussion of standing and mootness.
The Court stated that to establish standing in Clean Water Act citizen suits,
plaintiffs do not need to "prove" violations in their complaints - they need
only make "good faith showings" of violations. 45 With respect to mootness,
the Court concluded that if the defendant is able to prove that the alleged
violations are not reasonably expected to recur, the defendant should be able
to dismiss the action as moot.46
The Supreme Court remanded the case because the lower courts incorrectly
held that citizen suits under the Clean Water Act could be maintained for
wholly past violations. The case was remanded with instructions to determine
whether CBF's complaint contained a good faith allegation of an ongoing vio-
lation at Gwaltney's facility. 47
C. Gwaltney on Remand
On remand, the Fourth Circuit identified another issue for the district court
to address in addition to determining whether CBF's complaint contained a
good faith allegation of an ongoing violation. The Fourth Circuit remanded
the case to the district court to require the district court to determine whether
CBF had proved their allegations of ongoing (i.e., continuous or intermittent)
violations.48 The appellate court issued the following remand instructions to
guide the district court's evaluation:
411 at 59.
42 d. at 60.
43 d. at 62 (citing S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 79, 2 Leg. Hist. 1497, noting that citizen participation
under the Clean Water Act is "modeled on the provision enacted in the Clean Air Amendments
of 1970").
44Id.
45 d. at 64.
46Id. at 66.47 d, at 67.
48844 F.2d 170, 171 (4th Cir. 1988) (per curium).
[clitizen-plaintiffs may show proof either (1) by proving violations that continue on or
after the date the complaint is filed, or (2) by adducing evidence from which a reasonable
trier of fact could find a continuing likelihood of recurrence in intermittent or sporadic
violations. Intermittent or sporadic violations do not cease to be ongoing until the date
when there is no real likelihood of repetition.
49
The Fourth Circuit also listed factors that the district court may consider in its
evaluation: (1) whether remedial action was taken to correct Clean Water Act
violations; (2) the ex ante effectiveness of remedial measures that Gwaltney
had undertaken; and (3) any other considerations that would show that
Gwaltney's violations had been completely eradicated when the plaintiffs filed
suit.
Applying the Fourth Circuit's remand guidelines, the district court held that
the trial testimony of two witnesses indicated that a reasonable likelihood ex-
isted that permit violations would recur.5 0 The court stated that when CBF
filed its suit in June 1984, there was no certainty that the risk of continued
violations had been eradicated. These recurrences were possible despite the
improved pollution control equipment that Gwaltney installed in 1982 and
1983. Concluding that CBF had met its burden of proof for establishing ongo-
ing violations, the district court reinstated its original $1.3 million judgment
against Gwaltney. 5 l
Gwaltney subsequently appealed the case back to the Fourth Circuit. The
Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not have jurisdiction to impose
penalties for chlorine violations because it was clear that Gwaltney had abated
those violations. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit instructed the district court to
assess Gwaltney's penalties based on TKN violations only, in the amount of
$290,000.52
In determining whether Gwaltney's violations were "ongoing," the Fourth
Circuit held that it must consider the facts not with the advantage of hindsight,
but from the time of the original suit.5 3 The court concluded that at the time of
trial the TKN violations could reasonably be expected to recur.54 The court
based its conclusion on witness testimony at the original trial indicating that
the then-current condition of Gwaltney's TKN collecting lagoons was substan-
dard, and witness testimony by both parties indicating that there was reason-
able doubt as to whether Gwaltney could remain within its permit limitations
during winter months, which were approaching at the time of trial.
With respect to mootness, the Fourth Circuit stated that civil penalties attach
when violations occur and because violations are discovered after they occur,
liability attaches for the permit violation based on an event in the past.5 5 The
court noted that it is a well-established legal principle that the cessation of
illegal activity does not moot a case. 56 Thus, the appellate court stated that any
violations that plaintiffs prove as ongoing at trial must be related to present
491d. at 171-72.
50688 F. Supp. 1078, 1079 (E.D. Va. 1988).
51Id.
52890 F.2d 690, 698 (4th Cir. 1989).
53Id. at 693.541d. at 695-96.
S5 d. at 696.
56d. (citing United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953)).
wrongdoing. Once an ongoing violation is proved at trial, the district court is
required to assess civil penalties.
Applying these mootness principles, the Fourth Circuit concluded that it was
absolutely clear that Gwaltney's TKN violations had ceased at the time CBF
filed suit because Gwaltney's new pollution control equipment had produced
no chlorine violations since October 1982.57 The appellate court held that the
district court erred in assessing penalties for the "wholly past" chlorine viola-
tions and for not evaluating permit violations on a "parameter-by-parameter"
basis.58 As Part III of this article illustrates, this distinction formed the basis of
extensive litigation and confusion among the federal courts in applying the
Gwaltney standard in subsequent Clean Water Act cases.
III. APPLICATION OF THE GWALTNEY STANDARD IN CLEAN WATER
ACT CASES
In the wake of the ultimate resolution of the Gwaltney case on remand from
the Supreme Court, many questions remained unanswered for federal courts
attempting to apply the Gwaltney standard in Clean Water Act cases. First, the
post-Gwaltney courts had to address the difficult issue of distinguishing be-
tween "ongoing" and "wholly past" violations. Second, in cases where a viola-
tor brought itself into compliance with its permit conditions after suit was filed,
the post-Gwaltney courts had to determine whether such post-complaint com-
pliance rendered the suit moot, and whether to assess civil penalties and in
what amount. Third, some of the post-Gwaltney courts also evaluated whether
an ongoing violation of one permit parameter confers jurisdiction over the en-
tire permit or only over that specific limitation.
A. What Constitutes a "Good Faith" Allegation of an "Ongoing" Violation?
The courts applying the Gwaltney standard in the years immediately follow-
ing the Gwaltney decision tended to focus on determining what type of conduct
constitutes an "ongoing" violation and what a plaintiff needs to establish to
"allege in good faith" the existence of such violations. For example, in Sierra
Club, Inc. v. Simkins Indus., Inc.,59 the Sierra Club sued the defendant for
failing to file quarterly discharge monitoring reports required under its
NPDES permit. The district court granted the Sierra Club's motion for partial
summary judgment on liability and assessed civil penalties against the
defendant. 60
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the defendant contended that the plaintiff's
complaint failed to establish jurisdiction under the Gwaltney standard for an
ongoing violation. Citing Gwaltney, the Fourth Circuit held that the Sierra
Club had proved that an ongoing violation existed, even though the defend-
ant's failure to retain sampling records as required under its NPDES permit
57 1d.
58Id. at 693, 698.59Sierra Club, Inc. v. Simkins Indus., Inc,, 847 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
3185 (1989).
60Sierra Club, Inc. v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1120 (D. Md. 1985); see also 847 F.2d at
1111.
occurred solely prior to the complaint. 61 Evidence in the record indicated that
the defendant had not filed a complete DMR until January 1985, three months
after the Sierra Club had filed its complaint. 62 The plaintiff was therefore able
to maintain jurisdiction by proving that the defendant's filing of incomplete
DMRs, a permit violation, continued past the date that the plaintiff filed its
complaint, even though the sampling failures occurred solely prior to the filing
of the complaint.
The court in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Outboard Marine
Corp.6 3 also addressed the threshold for establishing ongoing violations under
the Gwaltney standard. In Outboard Marine, the plaintiff filed a Clean Water
Act citizen suit alleging violations of the pH and polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCB) parameters of the defendant's NPDES permit. The defendant con-
tended that its three violations over the course of three years did not constitute
ongoing violations under the Gwaltney standard.64 The court rejected the de-
fendant's position, stating that the Gwaltney court did not concern itself with
what frequency of violations is necessary for jurisdictional purposes, but with
whether the violations had conclusively ceased. 65 Therefore, the court held
that because one of the defendant's three violations occurred after the plain-
tiff's complaint was filed, the defendant had failed to implement remedial
measures that eliminated the cause of the violation.
66
In Hudson River Fisherman's Ass'n v. County of Westchester,67 the court
evaluated what type of showing is necessary to meet the "good faith allega-
tion" requirement of the Gwaltney standard. In this case, the plaintiff filed a
Clean Water Act citizen suit alleging failure to control drainage from a closed
landfill. 68 The drainage ditch adjacent to the closed landfill was connected to
an outflow pipe that discharged into a neighboring swimming area. The court
held that the portions of the plaintiff's complaint that alleged continuing dis-
charge into the swimming area satisfied the Gwaltney standard.69 The defend-
ant contended that the violations were not ongoing because the discharge had
been brought under control since the filing of the plaintiff's complaint. The
court stated that the state of affairs at the time the complaint is filed controls
the jurisdictional question.70 Thus, the court held that because the plaintiff
had submitted photographs and affidavits of landfill cap leaks and cap removal
to accommodate excess discharge, the complaint satisfied "the de minimis
prima facie standard for alleging in good faith an ongoing violation."
71
61Sierra Club, 847 F.2d at 1114.
62Id.
63692 F. Supp. 801 (N.D. 11. 1988).
641d. at 812, 814.
651d. at 814.
66 d. at 815 (quoting Gwaltney, 108 S.Ct. 376, 387 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
67686 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
68Id. at 1047.
69 d. at 1051.
70 d. (citing Gwaltney, 108 S.Ct. 376, 387).
71Id.
The Sixth Circuit, in Allen County Citizens for the Env't v. B.P. Oil Co.,7 2
affirmed without opinion a district court's holding that a single violation, oc-
curring after the filing of a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act, is not an
ongoing violation under the Gwaltney standard. The defendant's permit con-
tained 13 different pollutant parameters. The district court adopted the two-
part test from Gwaltney73 to determine whether an ongoing violation of any of
the parameters existed. The plaintiff's complaint alleged violations of two pa-
rameters that occurred between the 60-day notice period and the filing of the
complaint. The court ruled that the violations occurred before the complaint
was filed; thus, it was irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes that the violations
occurred after 60-day notice was given.74
The plaintiff in B.P. Oil also alleged six single-parameter violations that oc-
curred prior to the filing of the complaint and one that occurred after the filing
of the complaint. The time span between the date of the post-complaint viola-
tion and the most recent pre-complaint violation was 41 months. With respect
to the single violation occurring after the complaint was filed, the court held
that one violation of a pollution parameter does not constitute an ongoing vio-
lation. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that it need not "rule on
the cause of the problem or the likelihood of its recurrence. 75
Vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court for further consideration in
light of Gwaltney,76 the district court in Sierra Club, Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of
California77 decided against adopting the definition of "ongoing" violation
under Gwaltney.78 Instead, the court held that it would find a violation to be
"ongoing" by comparing self-reported exceedances before and after the com-
plaint was filed. If the same permit parameter is exceeded, or a violation re-
curs and the cause has not been completely eliminated, the violation will be
deemed ongoing and liability will attach. Self-reported exceedances reported
in the defendant's DMRs "constitute conclusive evidence of an exceedance of
a permit limitation."'79
The court in Union Oil held that the defendant was liable for all 74 viola-
tions admitted in its DMRs. The defendant contended that it had installed
equipment that had eliminated any chance of the violations recurring; how-
ever, the defendant's improvements had been found defective in an earlier de-
cision in the case. Therefore, the defendant's failure to raise a genuine issue of
material fact against plaintiffs' evidence of the violations constituted proof of
the violations.80
As the aforementioned cases reveal, post-Gwaltney courts reached disparate
and sometimes conflicting results in ascertaining the meaning of the most basic
component of the Gwaltney standard-how to define an ongoing violation. As
7 2 Allen County Citizens for the Env't v, B.P. Oil Co., 762 F. Supp. 733 (N.D. Ohio 1991), affd
without op., 966 F.2d 1451 (6th Cir. 1992).
73 See Part II. C., supra.
74762 F. Supp. at 743.
75Id.
76 See Union Oil Co. of California v. Sierra Club, Inc., 485 U.S. 931 (1988).
77716 F. Supp. 429 (N.D. Cal. 1988).7 81d. at 433.
791d.
8Od. at 433-34.
the next two sections illustrate, this confusion was only the beginning of what
would become widespread chaos among the courts in their efforts to under-
stand and apply the Gwaltney standard in Clean Water Act cases.
B. Ongoing Violations and Civil Penalties
The post-Gwaltney courts often addressed situations in which the Gwaltney
standard had to be applied to Clean Water Act citizen suits seeking both in-
junctive relief and civil penalties. In these cases, violators sometimes brought
themselves into compliance with their permit conditions after suit was filed.
Under such circumstances, the post-Gwaltney courts had to determine whether
such post-complaint compliance rendered the suit moot, and whether to assess
civil penalties and in what amount.
In Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Tyson Foods,81 the Eleventh Circuit
made a critical distinction between injunctive relief and the recovery of civil
penalties under the Gwaltney standard. In Tyson, the defendant sought to dis-
miss as moot the plaintiff's Clean Water Act citizen suit, contending that it had
installed new equipment that eliminated its NPDES permit violations. In one
of the first cases to apply the Gwaltney standard, the district court in Tyson
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that the de-
fendant's compliance with its NPDES permit after plaintiff filed its complaint
rendered the plaintiff's allegations moot.82
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit framed the issue in the following manner:
whether civil penalties may be assessed in a Clean Water Act citizen suit where
injunctive relief was available at the time suit was filed but became unavailable
due to the defendant's measures to bring itself into compliance with its
NPDES permit. 83 The court concluded that if the defendant comes into com-
pliance after the complaint is filed, then the mootness doctrine would prevent
the maintenance of the suit for injunctive relief, provided that there is no rea-
sonable likelihood that the wrongful activity will recur. However, the court
stated that "the mooting of injunctive relief will not moot the request for civil
penalties as long as such penalties were rightfully sought at the time the suit
was filed." 84 The court held that the defendant's installation of the pollution
control equipment rendered moot the plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief;
however, the defendant's DMRs from May 1986 to February 1988 (when the
plaintiff's allegations became moot) proved ongoing violations for which the
plaintiff could recover civil penalties. 85
In Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. Carter-Wallace, Inc.,86 the
court evaluated whether, and to what extent, civil penalties may be recovered
in an NPDES permit continuation context. In Carter-Wallace, the plaintiff al-
81897 F.2d 1128 (11th Cir. 1990).
82 Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 1186 (N.D. Ala. 1988).
83897 F.2d at 1134.
841d. at 1135.
851d. See also Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Pan American Tanning Corp., 993 F.2d
1017 (2d Cir. 1993) ("We hold therefore that a defendant's ability to show, after suit is filed but
before judgment is entered, that it has come into compliance with limits on the discharge of
pollutants will not render a citizen suit for civil penalties moot").
86684 F. Supp. 115 (D.N.J. 1988).
leged that the defendant committed wastewater discharge violations under two
contiguous discharge permits. The first permit was issued in 1975 and expired
in 1985 when a second, slightly different permit became effective. 87 The plain-
tiff filed a Clean Water Act citizen suit alleging 12 violations under the first
permit and 31 violations under the second.
Relying on Gwaltney, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment
requesting dismissal of all of the violations alleged under the first permit and
all of the pre-complaint violations alleged under the second permit.88 The de-
fendant contended that civil penalties in Clean Water Act citizen suits may
only be based on violations that can be cured by an injunctive order, and that
only post-complaint violations may be subject to civil penalties.
The court stated that section 505 authorized citizen suits seeking civil penal-
ties for permit violations under expired permits, provided that the conditions
in the expired permit are carried over to the new permit and are currently in
force. 89 Applying this standard to the facts of the case, the court concluded
that the plaintiff failed to prove that the 1985 permit limitations were identical
to the limitations in the 1975 permit. Although the court ruled that the viola-
tions of the 1975 permit were wholly past, the court concluded that it had juris-
diction over the plaintiff's allegations of ongoing violations of the defendant's
1985 permit. 90
The court in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gould, Inc.91 ad-
dressed the effect of pre- and post-complaint violations in the assessment of
civil penalties. In Gould, the plaintiff, the Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC), alleged 160 violations of the Clean Water Act, 157 of which occurred
prior to the filing of the complaint.92 In its initial opinion, the district court
granted NRDC's motion for summary judgment as to liability, but only for the
three post-complaint violations.93 The court further stated that civil penalties
may be imposed only for post-complaint violations; however, in determining
the amount of such penalty, the court may consider pre-complaint violations.94
The opinion in Gould was subsequently modified.95 In its revised opinion,
the district court held that civil penalties at trial must be linked to the plain-
tiffs proof that the defendant committed post-complaint violations or that at
the time of trial there is a reasonable likelihood that sporadic or intermittent
pollution will occur in the future.
The aforementioned limits on the recovery of civil penalties notwithstand-
ing, the post-Gwaltney courts generally were "pro-plaintiff" in their interpreta-
tion of the Gwaltney standard and its relationship to the recovery of civil
penalties in Clean Water Act citizen suits. Nevertheless, as the next section
discusses, citizen suit plaintiffs' recoveries of civil penalties were complicated
87Id. at 116-17.
88Id.
891d. at 119.
9OId. at 123.
91725 F. Supp. 634 (D. Mass. 1989), modified by 733 F. Supp. 8 (D. Mass. 1990).
92Id. at 635.
93Id. at 638.
941d. at 638 n.2.
95Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gould, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 8 (D. Mass. 1990).
by the post-Gwaltney courts' differing perspectives concerning whether civil
penalties should be assessed according to the individual permit parameters vio-
lated, or on the basis of permit compliance as a whole.
C. Does an Ongoing Violation of One Permit Parameter Confer Jurisdiction
Over the Entire Permit or Merely the One Parameter?
NPDES permits often contain multiple parameters governing the amounts
of specific pollutants that may be discharged. Courts applying the Gwaltney
standard in Clean Water Act citizen suits have used three approaches with
respect to the effect of violations of permit parameters: the "permit-based"
approach; the "parameter-by-parameter" approach; and the "modified by pa-
rameter" approach.
1. The "Permit-Based" Approach
Some courts have adopted a permit-based approach to evaluating particular
permit parameters and the effect of such violations under the Gwaltney stan-
dard. This approach provides that courts may exercise jurisdiction over all pa-
rameters based on a violation of any one permit parameter. For example, in
Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. Elf Atochem of North
America,96 environmental organizations filed a citizen suit under the Clean
Water Act for violations of the defendant's NPDES permit. The court held
that a good faith allegation of a continuing violation of at least one parameter
established jurisdiction over all of the past and present violations of the entire
permit. The court stated that the Clean Water Act citizen suit provision autho-
rizes citizen suits against any person "who is alleged to be in violation of an
effluent standard or limitation." The court concluded that since the Clean
Water Act defines "effluent standard or limitation" to include "a permit or
condition thereof," a good faith allegation of a violation of an effluent stan-
dard (i.e., a parameter) confers jurisdiction over the entire permit.
Similarly, in Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. Hercules, Inc.,97
the court adopted the permit-based approach in holding that the court may
exercise jurisdiction over all parameters based on an ongoing violation of any
parameter. The court stressed, however, that the facts of the case facilitated its
decision to employ the permit-based approach in light of the fact that multiple
parameters of the permit at issue had been violated in the past.98
2. The "Parameter-by-Parameter" Approach
After the concept of the parameter-by-parameter approach was first intro-
duced in the Fourth Circuit's decision on remand in Gwaltney,99 several other
courts followed up on the idea. For example, the court in Natural Resources
96817 F. Supp. 1164 (D.N.J. 1993).
97830 F. Supp. 1525 (D.N.J. 1993), affd in part, rev'd in part by 50 F.3d 1239 (3d Cir. 1995).
98M. at 1534. See also Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. Yates Indus., Inc., 790
F. Supp. 511, 516 (D.N.J. 1991) ("We hold that evidence of violations in some parameters is
admissible as evidence that future violations are likely in other parameters, thus satisfying the
requirements of Gwaltney, particularly where, as is the case here, numerous parameters have
been violated on many occasions since the filing of the suit.").99Gwaltney, 890 F.2d at 693, 698.
Defense Council, Inc. v. Gould, Inc. held that it will conduct a parameter-by-
parameter analysis in its determination of ongoing violations and in its assess-
ment of penalties. 00 Similarly, in Sierra Club, Inc. v. Union Oil Co.,10 1 the
court stated that if a violation of the same parameter of an NPDES permit is
repeated, or a violation recurs and the cause has not been completely elimi-
nated, the violation will be deemed ongoing and liability will attach. In addi-
tion, the court in Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Tyson Foods
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determined that the daily maximum civil penalty may be applied to each viola-
tion of an NPDES permit on a parameter-by-parameter basis.
3. The "Modified by Parameter" Approach
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Texaco Refining and Market-
ing, Inc.,103 the court developed and applied what it termed the "modified by
parameter" test to a Gwaltney-type ongoing violation factual scenario. In Tex-
aco, the NRDC filed a Clean Water Act citizen suit alleging 344 NPDES per-
mit violations between 1983 and 1988.104 The defendant moved for summary
judgment, contending that its permit, which was reissued in 1989, defeated the
plaintiff's jurisdiction to recover for the violations from 1983 to 1988. The de-
fendant urged the court to adopt a parameter-by-parameter jurisdictional
analysis.
The NRDC contended that jurisdiction under section 505 attached not to
specific violations, but to cases,' 0 5 and that jurisdiction attaches when permits
are violated, not when particular types of violations continue to occur. The
court agreed with the NRDC's position, holding that once jurisdiction had
been established, the court may consider past, present, and potential future
violations. Therefore, the court held that the violations occurring from Janu-
ary 1983 to January 1988 were ongoing, even though the NRDC did not file its
notice of intent to sue until March 1988 and did not file its complaint until May
1988.
Texaco appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit. The issue before the Third Circuit was whether a good faith allegation of
a continuing violation of a permit parameter confers jurisdiction over the en-
tire permit, or only over the specific violations alleged in the complaint. The
court held that jurisdiction attaches to good faith allegations of continuing vio-
lations of the specifically alleged parameter and to violations of parameters not
specifically alleged but related to a common flaw in the treatment process that
caused the alleged violations.' 0 6
In reaching its decision, the Third Circuit considered each of the three op-
tions before determining that this "modified by parameter" approach was best.
The other two options were the "permit-based" and "parameter-by-parame-
ter" approaches. Under the permit-based approach, jurisdiction attaches to all
100733 F. Supp. at t0.
101716 F. Supp. 429.
102897 F.2d 1128, 1138-39 (11th Cir. 1990).
103719 F. Supp. 281 (D. Del. 1989), affid in part, rev'd in part by 2 F.3d 493 (3d Cir. 1993).
104d at 283.
105Id. at 287.
1062 F.3d 493, 498 (3d Cir. 1993).
alleged past, present, and future violations. The court stated that the permit-
based approach is overly broad because it allows citizens to sue for wholly past
violations of several permit parameters merely by alleging, in good faith, an
ongoing violation of one parameter. The court also rejected the "parameter by
parameter" approach, which would require a court to examine each violation
or set of violations of each parameter separately. The court recognized that
this approach is flawed because often there is a single underlying cause of sev-
eral different parameter violations.
The "modified by parameter" approach is the most sensible and workable
interpretation of the Gwaltney standard for Clean Water Act cases. Although
it is the brainchild of the Third Circuit, the "modified by parameter" approach
is the culmination of almost a decade of interpreting and applying the
Gwaltney standard in Clean Water Act cases throughout the federal court sys-
tem. The "modified by parameter" approach is more politically palatable than
the "permit-based" or "parameter-by-parameter" approaches and more under-
standable and easier to apply than the Gwaltney standard. This approach also
has the potential to promote environmental protection without being unduly
onerous to industries that make good faith efforts to bring themselves into
compliance with the terms of their NPDES permits.
Thus, Congress should amend the Clean Water Act citizen suit provision to
incorporate the modified by parameter approach set forth in Texaco.10 7 As
Parts IV and V of this article analyze, however, any amendments to the Clean
Water Act citizen suit provision should not govern citizen suits under RCRA,
CERCLA, the Clean Air Act, or EPCRA.
IV. STRETCHING THE ENVELOPE: POST- GWALTNEY CASE LAW UNDER
RCRA, CERCLA, AND THE CLEAN AIR ACT
The Gwaltney standard established the jurisdictional requirements for Clean
Water Act citizen suits and, arguably, for citizen suits under other federal envi-
ronmental statutes containing similar language. However, as this Part of the
article discusses, the unique DMR-based reporting system and enforcement
scheme of the Clean Water Act often complicates and thwarts the applicability
of Gwaltney beyond the Clean Water Act context. 10 8
A. RCRA and CERCLA
Unlike the Clean Water Act, RCRA authorizes two types of citizen suits
against alleged violators.10 9 The first type of action, under section 7002
107A previous effort to amend the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision was unsuccessful.
In July 1993, Senators Baucus (D-Mont.) and Chaffee (R-R.I.) introduced S. 1114 to amend and
reauthorize the Clean Water Act. The bill proposed to amend the citizen suit provision to re-
spond to and replace the Gwaltney standard. The proposed language would have inserted lan-
guage using the past tense into the current citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act that
would allow citizens to sue for wholly past permit violations. This initiative died amidst the ex-
tensive Congressional "rollback" of environmental legislation in 1995.
1OBut see, e.g, Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176, 1183 (M.D. Tenn. 1988) (injunctive relief
under Toxic Substances Control Act's citizen suit provision is limited to the restraint of ongoing
violations under Gwaltney).
1o9RCRA's citizen suit provision, 42 U.S.C. § 6972, provides in pertinent part:
(a)(1)(A) of the Act,110 essentially mirrors the "alleged to be in violation" lan-
guage and structure of the Clean Water Act citizen suit provision. Section
7002 (a)(1)(B) of RCRA, however, authorizes citizen suits against any past or
present RCRA offender who has contributed or who is contributing to past or
present solid waste handling practices that "may present an imminent and sub-
stantial endangerment to health or the environment.""' In this type of RCRA
citizen suit, "the endangerment must be ongoing, but the conduct that created
it need not be."'1 2
The court in Lutz v. Chromatex" 3 addressed the applicability of the
Gwaltney standard to citizen suits for past violations under CERCLA and sec-
tion 7002 (a)(1)(A) of RCRA. The plaintiff sought to recover under the citi-
zen suit provisions of RCRA and CERCLA for the defendant's alleged
contamination of private drinking water wells. The defendant moved for sum-
mary judgment, contending that the plaintiff's complaint did not satisfy the
Gwaltney standard. On the CERCLA claim, the court held that because Con-
gress used the same "alleged to be in violation" language in the citizen suit
provisions of CERCLA and the Clean Water Act, Gwaltney's exclusion of citi-
zen suits for wholly past violations applies to CERCLA's citizen suit
provision.14
For the same reasons it denied the CERCLA claim, the court also held that
RCRA does not authorize citizen suits for wholly past violations." 5 The court
reasoned that the plaintiffs allegations failed to satisfy the Gwaltney standard
because they were written almost entirely in the past tense and did not allege
that the defendant's violations "continued beyond the filing of the complaint
or are likely to recur in the future. 116
On two distinct grounds, other courts have reached the conclusion opposite
that of the Lutz court in addressing RCRA section 7002 (a)(1)(A) citizen suits
(a) In general
Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this section, any person may commence a civil action on
his own behalf -
(1)(A) against any person... who is alleged to be in violation of any permit, standard, regulation,
condition, requirement, prohibition, or order which has become effective pursuant to this chapter;
or
(B) against any person, including ... any past or present generator, past or present transporter, or
past or present owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed
or who is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal
of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to
health or the environment ....
Any action under paragraph (a)(1) of this subsection shall be brought in the district court for the dis-
trict in which the alleged violation occurred or the alleged endangerment may occur. Any action
brought under paragraph (a)(2) of this subsection may be brought in the district court for the district in
which the alleged violation occurred or in the District Court of the District of Columbia.
Id. § 6972 (a)(1) (1994).
110d. § 6972 (a)(1)(A).
l"Id. § 6972 (a)(1)(B).
l1 2 City of Toledo v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 646, 654 (N.D. Ohio 1993)
(citing Connecticut Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 989 F.2d 1305 (2d
Cir. 1993)).
113718 F. Supp. 413 (M.D. Pa. 1989).
114 d. at 421.
115d. at 425.
ll6ld.
for past violations. First, courts have compared the language of section 7002
(a)(1)(A) and the Clean Water Act citizen suit provision. For example, the
court in Gache v. Town of Harrison117 relied on the language in RCRA section
7002 (a)(1) which, unlike the present tense language of the Clean Water Act's
citizen suit provisions, requires that RCRA citizen suits be filed in the district
in which the alleged violation occurred.118
Courts have also relied on the different nature of past violations under
RCRA and CERCLA as compared to those under the Clean Water Act. Ad-
dressing the different nature of past hazardous waste violations, the court in
City of Toledo v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc.119 held that the disposal of
wastes "can constitute a continuing violation as long as no proper disposal pro-
cedures are put into effect or as long as the waste has not been cleaned up and
the environmental effects remain remediable.' 20 The City of Toledo court
cited approvingly the decision in Fallowfield Dev. Corp. v. Strunk,121 which
stated that a hazardous waste violation, unlike water pollution, "continues un-
til the proper disposal procedures are put into effect or the hazardous waste is
cleaned up.' 22
Therefore, although the citizen suit provisions of RCRA and CERCLA par-
allel the language and structure of the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision,
the different nature of hazardous waste violations as compared to water pollu-
tion violations, and the discrepancy in aspects of the language of RCRA's pro-
vision as compared to its Clean Water Act counterpart, militate against
extending the Gwaltney standard to govern RCRA or CERCLA citizen suits
for past violations.
B. Legislative Erosion of the Gwaltney Standard: The Effect of the 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments
Although the Clean Air Act was the first federal environmental statute to
contain a citizen suit provision, few citizen suits were filed under the Act prior
to the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. One of the primary reasons for the
paucity of Clean Air Act citizen suits was the lack of a concrete monitoring
system to detect and record violations that is comparable to the ease with
which environmental groups can ascertain a Clean Water Act violation by re-
viewing DMRs.
The 1990 Amendments included three important revisions that may enhance
the frequency with which Clean Air Act citizen suits123 are filed. First, the
117813 F. Supp. 1037 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
1181d. at 1041 (emphasis added).
119833 F. Supp. 646.
1201d. at 656.
1211990 WL 52745 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 1990).
12 2 City of Toledo at 656 (citing Fallowfield, 1990 WL 52745 at *10). The City of Toledo court
also addressed whether the failure to fulfill a reporting requirement under CERCLA §103 (c)
constitutes a wholly past or an ongoing violation of CERCLA. The court held that CERCLA
§ 103 (c) imposes a one-time reporting requirement, the violation of which is wholly past and may
not form the basis of a CERCLA citizen suit. Id. at 661.
123The citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act, as revised by the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments, provides in pertinent part:
(a) Authority to bring civil action; jurisdiction
amendments require facilities to submit monitoring reports and compliance
certifications to permitting agencies, similar to the DMR requirement under
the Clean Water Act, thereby easing environmental groups' efforts to detect
and determine the degree to which a facility has failed to comply with its per-
mit requirements.124 Second, civil penalties were added to the citizen suit en-
forcement arsenal, again bringing the Clean Air Act's citizen suit provision
"up to speed" with its Clean Water Act counterpart. 125 Third, effective since
November 15, 1992, the revised Clean Air Act citizen suit provision authorizes
citizens to bring actions against persons "alleged to have violated" an emission
standard, limitation or order, provided that there is "evidence that the viola-
tion has been repeated."'1 26 The amendments, however, do not define "re-
peated violations," an omission that is likely to be the subject of future
litigation.
The legislative history of the 1990 Amendments contains conflicting ac-
counts as to whether the revised language of the Clean Air Act citizen suit
provision represents an effort to conform the provision to the Gwaltney stan-
dard or whether it signaled a deliberate departure from Gwaltney. Senate
managers Chaffee and Baucus stated that the conferees intended that "citizens
should be allowed to seek civil penalties against violators of the Act whenever
two or more violations have occurred in the past."'1 27 In addition, Senator
Baucus announced that the revised language marks a departure from the
Gwaltney precedent, stating that "in response to the Supreme Court ruling in
Gwaltney ... the conference agreement allows citizen suits to be brought with
respect to past violations if there is evidence that the violation has been re-
peated."'1 28 However, the legislative history also contains statements that di-
rectly contradict the statements of Senators Baucus and Chaffee. For example,
Representative Norman Lent of New York stated that "we modified the citizen
suit provision on past violations to conform to the Supreme Court's Gwaltney
decision."129
President Bush's signing statement in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
reflects that Congress had the Gwaltney standard in mind when it amended the
Clean Air Act's citizen suit provision:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any person may commence a civil action on his own
behalf-
(1) against any person ... who is alleged to have violated (if there is evidence that the alleged
violation has been repeated) or to be in violation of
(A) an emission standard or limitation under this chapter or
(B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation.
42 U.S.C. § 7604 (a)(1) (1994).
t24Similarly, the EPA issued a final rule in February 1997 that authorizes citizens to use a
greater range of evidence in proving violations of the Clean Air Act. "Credible Evidence Revi-
sions," 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 60, and 61, 62 Fed. Reg. 8,314 (1997).
12542 U.S.C. § 7604 (a).
1261d. § 7604 (a)(1).
127136 CONG. REC. S16,895-01, S16,953 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
128136 CONG. REC. S18,037-02, S18,040 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990); see also 136 CONG. REC.
S3233-03, 3239-40 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1990) (statement of Sen. Mitchell, stating that Gwaltney
does not prevent Congress from legislatively authorizing suits for wholly past violations).
129136 Cong. Rec. E3694-02, E3695 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1990) (statement of Rep. Lent).
I note that in providing for citizen suits for civil penalties, the Congress has codified the
Supreme Court's interpretations of such provisions in the Gwaltney case. As the Constitu-
tion requires, litigants must show, at a minimum, intermittent, rather than purely past vio-
lations of the statute in order to bring suit.
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Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether, and to what extent, the amended
Clean Air Act citizen suit provision overrules the Gwaltney standard.
Since the enactment of the 1990 Amendments, at least one case has ad-
dressed the effect of the Gwaltney standard on the revised Clean Air Act citi-
zen suit provision. In Fried v. Sungard Recovery Servs., Inc., 3 the plaintiffs
filed a Clean Air Act citizen suit against contractors for alleged violations of
provisions of the Clean Air Act governing asbestos removal. 132 The court di-
rected further briefing as to whether the Clean Air Act's asbestos provisions
applied to the contractor's activities and whether such requirements were vio-
lated at all, repeatedly or continuously. 133
The court stated that the amended Clean Air Act citizen suit provision over-
ruled Gwaltney with respect to wholly past violations. The court concluded
that the Clean Air Act as amended allows citizen suits for "both continuing
and wholly past violations, so long as the past violation occurred more than
once."' 34 The court indicated that the Gwaltney standard would govern the
evaluation of violations that continue to the date that an action is filed,
whereas the plain language of the revised Clean Air Act citizen suit provision
authorizes recovery for "wholly past" violations without having to satisfy the
Gwaltney threshold of making a good faith allegation of an "ongoing"
violation.135
The court's analysis in Sungard Recovery concerning the effect of the
amended Clean Air Act citizen suit provision on the Gwaltney standard is an
accurate and sensible interpretation of the language and legislative history of
the revised Clean Air Act citizen suit provision. Until Congress acts to amend
the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision, the Sungard Recovery court's dis-
tinction between the reach and effect of the two citizen suit provisions should
remain good law. Otherwise, the revised Clean Air Act citizen suit provision
would amount to nothing more than a contorted recapitulation of the already
ambiguous Gwaltney standard.
V. A FISH OUT OF WATER: THE MISAPPLICATION OF THE GWALTNEY
STANDARD TO THE EPCRA CITIZEN SUIT PROVISION
Since Gwaltney, federal courts have reached conflicting results in interpret-
ing and applying the Gwaltney standard outside the context of the Clean Water
Act. The Gwaltney standard has been applied in EPCRA citizen suit cases
more so than under any other federal environmental statute, excluding the
Clean Water Act. The circuits are split, however, as to whether EPCRA's citi-
130 President's Statement on Signing the Bill Amending the Clean Air Act, 26 Weekly Comp.
Pres. Doc. 1824 (Nov. 15, 1990).
131916 F. Supp. 465 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
132 1d. at 467.
133 d. at 469.
134 Id.
135id. at 468.
zen suit provision authorizes recovery for past violations consistent with, or
independent of, the Gwaltney standard.
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A. EPCRA Overview
Like the Clean Water Act, EPCRA requires extensive self-reporting and the
information derived from such reporting may form the basis of a citizen suit.
EPCRA was enacted to "provide the public with important information on the
hazardous chemicals in their communities,"'137 and establish reporting, notifi-
cation, and planning requirements to aid federal, state, and local authorities in
preparing for and dealing with an emergency caused by the release of a haz-
ardous chemical. 138 The legislative history of EPCRA indicates that Congress
intended that this information should be made available to the public as
quickly and efficiently as possible.
139
Section 313 of EPCRA requires regulated facilities to submit, by July 1
every year, toxic chemical release forms ("form Rs") that contain information
regarding the toxic chemicals that such facilities manufactured, produced or
used during the preceding calendar year.' 40 An owner or operator who vio-
lates this requirement is subject to civil penalties of up to $25,000 per violation,
per day. 141
Congress sought to fulfill two goals by requiring companies to comply with
EPCRA's requirements for submission of information concerning their toxic
chemical releases. First, companies must provide information concerning toxic
chemical releases to the neighbors of these facilities that the affected parties
can use to make life choices, such as where to live, where to work, and where
to recreate. Second, companies must provide information to federal, state, and
local governments to be used to compare facilities or geographic areas, identify
hotspots, evaluate existing environmental programs, more effectively set regu-
latory priorities, and track pollution control and waste reduction programs.
142
To help attain these goals, Congress included a citizen suit provision within
EPCRA's enforcement scheme. The citizen suit provision 43 authorizes citi-
136Compare Citizens for a Better Env't v. The Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237 (7th Cir. 1996) (past
violations are recoverable under EPCRA's citizen suit provision) with Atlantic States Legal
Found. v. United Musical Instruments U.S.A., Inc., 61 F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 1995) (past violations are
not recoverable under EPCRA's citizen suit provision).
1371-Iouse Committee on Energy and Commerce, Superfund Amendments of 1986, H.R. Rep.
No. 253, 99th Cong.. 2d Sess. (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2835,
2841.
138-I.R. Conf. Rep. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 281 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3276, 3374.
139 See S. Rep. No. 11, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. 15 (1985); H.R. Rep. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 1, at 111 (1985).
14042 U.S.C. § 11023 (a) (1994).
1411d. § 11045 (c)(1).
142Amicus brief of the United States Department of Justice in Support of Petition for Rehear-
ing with Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 12-13, Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. United
Medical Instruments, U.S.A., Inc., 61 F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 1993)(No. 93-4379)(hereinafter DOJ
Amicus Briel) (citing U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1993 Toxic Release Inventory Pub-
lic Data Release at 4 (March 1995)).
143EPCRA's citizen suit provision provides in pertinent part that citizen suits may be brought
against:
(A) An owner or operator of a facility for failure to do any of the following:
zens to commence civil actions against owners or operators of a facility who
fail to: (1) submit an emergency notice under section 304;144 (2) submit mate-
rial safety data sheets under section 311; 145 (3) complete and submit an inven-
tory form under section 312; 146 or (4) complete and submit a form R under
section 313.147 The citizen suit provision also authorizes plaintiffs to file ac-
tions against the EPA, state governors, or State Emergency Response Commis-
sions for failing to provide a mechanism for public access to EPCRA
information.
B. The Initial Cases: The Gwaltney Standard Does Not Govern EPCRA
Citizen Suits for Past Violations
Although EPCRA's citizen suit provision has been an effective tool to com-
pel facilities to report under EPCRA, federal courts are divided as to whether
civil penalties may be awarded in citizen suits alleging wholly past violations of
EPCRA's reporting requirements. Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Whiting
Roll-Up Door Mfg. Corp.148 was the first case to address the applicability of
the Gwaltney standard to past violations under the citizen suit provision of
EPCRA. In Whiting, Atlantic States Legal Foundation (ASLF), an environ-
mental group, sued the defendant for allegedly failing to submit required infor-
mation under EPCRA sections 311, 312, and 313. After receiving ASLF's
notice of intent to sue and prior to the date that ASLF filed suit, Whiting
brought itself into compliance with EPCRA requirements. Whiting filed a mo-
tion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, contending that under the
Gwaltney standard, the violations should be deemed "wholly past" and there-
fore unactionable.
The court held that EPCRA confers jurisdiction over citizen suits for past
violations.149 The court reasoned that the plain language of EPCRA's citizen
suit provision differed significantly from the Clean Water Act provision. It
noted that EPCRA authorizes citizen suits for an owner's or operator's failure
to comply with EPCRA's reporting requirements, which the court determined
to include past acts of noncompliance. The court further noted that EPCRA's
citizen suit provision did not contain the pervasive use of the present tense
language contained in the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision.150
Subsequent federal district court decisions adhered to the reasoning in Whit-
ing Roll-Up Door. For example, in Williams v. Leybold Technologies, Inc.,
151
the court held that the plain language and legislative history of EPCRA
... (iii) Complete and submit an inventory form under section 11022 (a) of this title containing tier I
information as described in section 11022 (d)(1) of this title unless such requirement does not apply
by reason of the second sentence of section 11022 (a)(2) of this title.
(iv) Complete and submit a toxic chemical release form under section 11023(a) of this title.
Id. § 11046 (a) (1994).
14442 U.S.C. § 11004 (1994).
1451d. § 11021.
146d. § 11022.
147Id. § 11023.
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demonstrate that past violations are actionable under EPCRA's citizen suit
provision.152 Several other federal district courts have held that EPCRA's citi-
zen suit provision provides the federal courts with jurisdiction for past viola-
tions of the Act.153
C. The Split in the Circuits: United Medical Instruments and Steel Company
In Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. United Musical Instruments, U.S.A.,
Inc.,154 the defendant, United Medical Instruments (UMI), conceded that from
1988 to 1991 it had failed to file form Rs for its use and release of at least two
chemicals. On July 17, 1992, the plaintiff, Atlantic States Legal Foundation
(ASLF), filed its notice of intent to sue UMI for violating EPCRA section 313.
On July 21, 1993, ASLF filed its complaint alleging that UMI failed to timely
submit form Rs for the years 1988-1991. After receiving ASLF's notice and
prior to the date ASLF filed its complaint, UMI submitted the required
forms. 155
The Sixth Circuit held that the citizen suit provision of EPCRA does not
authorize suits for reporting violations that are not continuing at the time the
complaint is filed. The court stated that the citizen suit speaks only of the
completion and filing of the required forms; therefore, only the failure to com-
plete and submit the required forms can provide the basis for a citizen suit.156
The court also distinguished between the type of relief that the EPA may seek
under EPCRA and that available under the citizen suit provision of the Act.
The court stated that Congress authorized the EPA to bring actions to assess
and collect "any civil penalty for which a person is liable,"'1 57 whereas Con-
gress limited citizen suits by "emphasizing that it is the failure to submit the
requisite forms that gives rise to a citizen action. ' 158 The court further stated
that to award civil penalties for violations that have been cured by late filing
would undermine the purpose of the 60-day notice provision.
The Seventh Circuit in Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Company159 dis-
agreed with the outcome and reasoning in the United Medical Instruments case.
In this case, Citizens for a Better Environment (CBE) filed an EPCRA citizen
suit against the defendant, alleging that the defendant: (1) failed to comply
with EPCRA Section 312 by failing to file reports detailing its use of certain
"hazardous" and "extremely hazardous" chemicals by March 1 of each year
since 1988;160 and (2) failed to comply with EPCRA Section 313 by not filing
reports detailing the company's release of certain "toxic" chemicals into the
1521d. at 769.
153See, e.g., Don't Waste Arizona, Inc. v. McLane Foods, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 972 (D. Ariz. 1997);
Delaware Valley Toxics Coalition v. Kurz-Hastings, 813 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Atlantic
States Legal Found., Inc. v. Buffalo Envelope Co., No. 90-CV-11105, 1991 WL 183772 (W.D.N.Y.
1991).
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environment by July 1 of each year since 1988.161 The defendant moved to
dismiss the suit, contending that it had filed the required reports after receiving
CBE's notice. The company maintained that its filing of the reports cured its
previous non-compliance with EPCRA and thus deprived the court of jurisdic-
tion over the matter. 162
The district court in Steel Company held that because the defendant had
responded to the plaintiffs' pre-suit notice by filing eight years' worth of re-
quired reports, it was no longer in violation of EPCRA. Following the Sixth
Circuit in United Musical Instruments, the court stated that Congress intended
to limit citizen suits to correcting ongoing violations of EPCRA and vest the
EPA with sole authority to seek penalties for past violations.
In a thorough and well-reasoned opinion, the Seventh Circuit reversed the
district court's holding in Steel Company. In reaching its conclusion that EP-
CRA's citizen suit provision authorizes suits for wholly past violations, the ap-
pellate court examined various aspects of the language of EPCRA's citizen suit
provision. First, the court distinguished EPCRA's language, which authorizes
citizen suits "for failure to" comply with the Act, from the Clean Water Act,
which authorizes citizen suits when a defendant is "alleged to be in violation"
of the Act.163 The court held that EPCRA's citizen suit provision lacked the
temporal limitation embodied in the Clean Water Act provision, noting that a
failure to do something can include a past or present failure.1
64
Like the Supreme Court in Gwaltney, the Seventh Circuit in Steel Company
also reviewed the enforcement structure of the statute at issue. The court con-
cluded that because EPCRA lacked the present tense phrasing contained in
the Clean Water Act, Congress intended to authorize citizen suits under EP-
CRA for violations that are not ongoing at the time a citizen complaint is
filed. 165 EPCRA provides that citizen suits must be filed in the district court
for the district in which the alleged violation occurred,166 whereas the Clean
Water Act citizen suit provision contains present-tense language throughout.
In the most recent case to address the applicability of the Gwaltney standard
to EPCRA citizen suits for past violations, the court in Don't Waste Arizona,
Inc. v. McLane Foods, Inc.,167 followed the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in the
Steel Company case. The plaintiff, an environmental and community educa-
tion organization, filed a citizen suit against defendant McLane Foods for fail-
ing to submit a Tier II report by March 1, 1994, for the calendar year 1993, and
a Tier II report by March 1, 1995, for the calendar year 1994.168 On April 28,
1995, the plaintiff gave notice of the defendant's alleged violations of EPCRA
and of plaintiff's intent to file suit to the Administrator of the EPA, the Re-
gional Administrator of the EPA Region IX, the Arizona Department of Envi-
1611d. at *2.
1621d.
163 1d. at 1243.
164Id.
1651d. at 1244.
16642 U.S.C. § 11046 (b)(1) (1994).
167950 F. Supp. 972 (D. Ariz. 1997).
168Id. at 973.
ronmental Quality, and the defendant. The plaintiff filed suit on August 28,
1995.
On May 12, 1995, after receipt of the plaintiff's notice of intent to sue but
before the plaintiff filed suit, the defendant filed the required reports. The
defendant contended that the court lacked jurisdiction over the suit because
the plaintiff sought to recover for wholly past violations of the Act.
Like the Seventh Circuit in Steel Company, the court in Don't Waste Arizona
held that EPCRA authorized citizen suits for past violations that had been
cured after receipt of notice of intent to file a citizen suit but before the suit
was filed. The court reiterated the Steel Company court's reliance on the lan-
guage and enforcement structure of EPCRA in reaching its conclusion.
169
From a policy perspective, the court further noted that if EPCRA citizen suits
for past violations are barred by the alleged violator's coming into compliance
prior to suit, then "facilities have an incentive not to comply with reporting
requirements until they have been caught.' 70
D. The Gwaltney Standard Should Not Govern Past Violations
Under EPCRA
On February 24, 1997, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the
Steel Company case and resolve the split in the circuits concerning EPCRA
citizen suits for past violations. 171 The issue before the Court is whether Con-
gress, in enacting EPCRA's citizen suit provision, intended to authorize citi-
zens to seek penalties for violations that were cured before a citizen suit is
filed, "thereby granting EPCRA citizen suit plaintiffs greater enforcement au-
thority than that granted to other citizen suit plaintiffs under other federal en-
vironmental statutes.' 72
The phrasing of this question presented before the Supreme Court is mis-
leading and slanted in favor of Steel Company's position in the case. EPCRA
citizen suits should not be interpreted to authorize something "more" than
what is available under citizen suit provisions of other federal environmental
statutes. Rather, the Court should construe the language and enforcement
structure of the EPCRA citizen suit provision merely to authorize relief for
past violations that need not meet the requirements of the Gwaltney standard.
Several courts interpreting the citizen suit provisions of EPCRA, the Clean
Air Act, and RCRA have reached this conclusion.173 In the Steel Company
case, the Supreme Court has the opportunity to definitively resolve the scope
and applicability of the Gwaltney standard to EPCRA citizen suits and, argua-
bly, citizen suits under other federal environmental statutes.
Even if the Gwaltney standard remains good law under the Clean Water
Act, it should not govern EPCRA citizen suits. When Congress enacted the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986, it estab-
lished two citizen suits provisions: one for CERCLA and one for EPCRA.
1691d. at 977.
170 d. at 978.
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173See Parts IV, V.B. and V.C., supra.
The CERCLA citizen suit provision authorizes suit against persons "alleged to
be in violation" of CERCLA, while EPCRA's citizen suit provision contains
no such limitation. Thus, it is fair to assume that Congress intended EPCRA's
citizen suit provision to authorize enforcement against persons who were no
longer "in violation" at the time of suit.174
Since EPCRA's citizen suit provision lacks the "alleged to be in violation"
language upon which the Gwaltney court based its interpretation of the Clean
Water Act citizen suit provision, it should not be governed by the outcome or
reasoning in Gwaltney. EPCRA's citizen suit provision also lacks the "perva-
sive use of the present tense" contained in the Clean Water Act provision. The
purpose of EPCRA citizen suits in general, as well as the role of the 60-day
notice period contained within the provision, must be considered. The under-
lying purpose of EPCRA citizen suits would be undermined if EPCRA citizen
suits for past violations are barred. A violator need do nothing to comply with
the law until it receives a notice letter from a citizen, then merely hastily file
the required reports to escape liability and civil penalties. Regarding the 60-
day notice provision, authorizing EPCRA citizen suits for past violations
would not render this requirement superfluous, as the UMI court suggested.
Notice serves two primary purposes: (1) to allow the EPA or the state enforce-
ment authority to file suit and preempt the citizen suit; and (2) to give the
alleged violator an opportunity to verify the allegations and contact the noti-
fier to resolve the dispute prior to the filing of a complaint, Notice also en-
sures, as a matter of fairness, that the alleged violator is aware that the citizen
has informed federal and state authorities of the alleged violations, who may
elect to act on their own. These purposes are entirely compatible with author-
izing EPCRA citizen suits for past violations. 175
The goals of the statute also must be examined. Late reporting under EP-
CRA cannot cure damage that has already occurred. Environmental citizen
suit jurisprudence recognizes three equally cognizable forms of injury: sub-
stantive, procedural, and informational. Injury to the chemical and biological
integrity of a waterbody, such as the type of harm that occurred in Gwaltney, is
"substantive" harm whereas being deprived of information, such as when form
Rs are not filed under EPCRA, is "informational" injury. Late reporting can-
not "cure" informational harm just as installing new pollution control equip-
ment cannot "cure" past water pollution violations. Thus, precluding EPCRA
citizen suits for past violations would thwart the goals of the statute. 176
Similarly, the monitoring mechanism available under the Clean Water Act
does not exist under EPCRA. Until a company reports its use and releases of
Section 313 regulated chemicals, the public agencies are unaware of whether
the company is required to report. Without investigations to determine com-
pliance, the people of communities whom the statute is designed to protect and
174DOJ Amicus Brief at 7-8.
175See Steel Company, 90 F.3d at 1244.176It is important to note, however, that the speed with which a violator files after receipt of a
citizen notice should be a factor to be considered in determining the amount of appropriate pen-
alties but should not be a factor in determining liability. See Petition for Rehearing with Sugges-
tion for Rehearing En Banc at 10-11, Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. United Medical
Instruments, U.S.A., Inc., 61 F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 1993)(No. 93-4379).
inform, and the public agencies that are charged with providing the informa-
tion, would be deprived of the information indefinitely.
177
CONCLUSION
In the past decade, courts applying the Gwaltney standard to citizen suits
under the Clean Water Act have struggled to understand the scope and appli-
cability of the standard. This difficult task became even more challenging
when courts attempted to extend the Gwaltney standard to govern citizen suits
under the Clean Air Act, RCRA, CERCLA, and EPCRA. However, there
are important distinctions between the nature of violations under the Clean
Water Act and violations under the Clean Air Act, RCRA, CERCLA, and
EPCRA. Moreover, these statutes operate under different enforcement
frameworks than the Clean Water Act. In fact, some of these distinctions are
reflected in the language of the citizen suit provisions of these statutes.
Despite the abundance of case law addressing the scope and applicability of
the Gwaltney standard, only three post-Gwaltney opinions have offered clear,
well-reasoned guidance to help chart the course for the next decade of inter-
preting Gwaltney. In the Clean Water Act context, the Third Circuit's opinion
in Texaco, with its "modified by parameter" approach to interpreting the
Gwaltney standard, stands out as the most sensible and politically palatable
resolution to this aspect of the controversy surrounding the Gwaltney standard.
In addition, the court in Sungard Recovery provides an excellent analysis of the
effect of the revised Clean Air Act citizen suit provision on the Gwaltney stan-
dard. Finally, the Seventh Circuit in Steel Company offers a thorough and ac-
curate analysis of how the EPCRA citizen suit provision is analytically distinct
from the Clean Water Act's provision and how EPCRA's citizen suit provision
must therefore be interpreted to authorize suits for wholly past violations of
the Act.
Although the Clean Air Act's citizen suit provision was amended to address
and, arguably, overrule the effect of the Gwaltney standard to Clean Air Act
cases, legislative initiatives to amend the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provi-
sion have failed. The Gwaltney standard should be legislatively revised to in-
corporate the Texaco "modified by parameter" approach to evaluating citizen
suits for past violations under the Clean Water Act. This legislative adjustment
under the Clean Water Act should, however, be deemed to be distinct from the
Clean Air Act Amendment language and the case law history interpreting the
citizen suit provisions of RCRA, CERCLA, and especially EPCRA.
The pending Supreme Court decision in the Steel Company case could set
the Gwaltney analysis on the right track for the next decade. The court should
construe the language and enforcement structure of the EPCRA citizen suit
provision to authorize relief for past violations without having to meet the re-
quirements of the Gwaltney standard. The Supreme Court's decision in Steel
Company could conclusively resolve the decade-old confusion regarding the
scope and applicability of the Gwaltney standard to EPCRA citizen suits and,
arguably, citizen suits under other federal environmental statutes.
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